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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FROM STATUTES OF LIMITATION
IN MARYLAND
I. INTRODUCTION
When do Maryland's statutes of limitation bind government?'
Private parties sued or prosecuted by government must answer this
question before pleading limitations as a defense. This comment
offers guidance to practitioners faced with this problem, considers
the policies underlying the present system, and suggests legislative
changes.
Most of Maryland's statutes of limitation are silent about their
applicability to government.2 Although the General Assembly has
the power to apply limitations to government when it sees fit,' it has
to a large extent left these decisions to the courts. Working in this
legislative void, Maryland's courts have adopted and applied the
common-law doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi (time does not run
against the crown).4
The nullum tempus doctrine upholds the supremacy of sovereign
immunity5 over statutes of limitation. As is well known, the doctrine
of sovereign immunity shields government from lawsuits by private
citizens; unless sovereign immunity is absent or waived, courts will
simply refuse to entertain suits by private plaintiffs against a govern-
ment. Nullum tempus works in the same way. It permits government
at all levels to ignore statutes of limitation, because courts adhering
to the doctrine will refuse to hear pleas of limitations against gov-
1. The term "government" refers in this comment to all governmental entities in
Maryland, including the state, counties, cities, towns, and their agencies and subunits.
The term "state" refers to all departments and agencies of the state of Maryland, and
the term "local government" refers to all governmental entities other than the state.
2. See Appendix, which lists Maryland's statutes of limitation by their order of ap-
pearance in the Annotated Code with references to where in this comment they are
discussed.
3. State v. Cadwalader, 227 Md. 21, 24, 174 A.2d 786, 787 (1961).
4. Central Collection Unit v. Atlantic Container Line, Ltd., 277 Md. 626, 629 n.3,
356 A.2d 555, 557 n.3 (1976).
5. Some prefer the term "governmental immunity." See, e.g., Austin v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 286 Md. 51, 53, 405 A.2d 255, 256 (1979) (asserting that "governmental" is
more accurate adjective because immunity applies to non-sovereign local governments
as well as to the sovereign state). I use the older term "sovereign immunity" because it
refers to the essential attribute of government that makes immunity plausible in the first
place, i.e., the government's sovereign monopoly of the use of force. Additionally, "gov-
ernmental immunity" is associated with the narrower subject of immunity from tort
claims. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 626 (5th ed. 1979).
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ernment by private defendants. In fact, nullum tempus is simply an
application of sovereign immunity to the narrow area of limitations
law.
Adherence to sovereign immunity can lead to unjust results.6
Thus, in recent years, the General Assembly has limited sovereign
immunity in tort and contract in an effort to secure substantial jus-
tice for citizens wronged by government. Nullum tempus does not
apply in these waiver situations. Although such waivers have elimi-
nated the most pernicious effects of nullum tempus, pockets of sover-
eign immunity remain. Because there is no logic in permitting
government to flout limitations laws through sovereign immunity,
nullum tempus should be abolished. The problem is one for the legis-
lature to resolve, by severing the common-law link between sover-
eign immunity and statutes of limitation embodied in the nullum
tempus doctrine and replacing the doctrine with a comprehensive
statutory scheme.
II. UNDERLYING POLICIES IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The policies underlying sovereign immunity bear no logical re-
lation to those supporting statutes of limitation. Little wonder,
therefore, that nullum tempus, the offspring of that union, should be
difficult to justify.
A. Sovereign Immunity
Immunity from private lawsuits, called "one of the highest at-
tributes of sovereignty," is the product of a long and obscure evolu-
tion.7 Several rationales have been offered over the centuries for
holding government immune from lawsuits.'
6. See, e.g., Austin, 286 Md. at 78-85, 405 A.2d at 269-73 (Cole, J., dissenting) (rec-
ommending that court abrogate common-law immunity as defense in tort action) and
cases cited therein.
7. Dunne v. State, 162 Md. 274, 288-89, 159 A. 751, 757, appeal dismissed and cert.
denied, 287 U.S. 564 (1932), quoted in Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. Pride
Homes, Inc., 291 Md. 537, 544, 435 A.2d 796, 800 (1981); R. WATKINS, THE STATE AS A
PARTY LITIGANT 1 (1927). How sovereign immunity came to be applied after 1776 to
American governments, over which no monarch presided, has been called "one of the
mysteries of legal evolution." Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 4
(1924).
8. Other minor theories justifying sovereign immunity have also been advanced.
The Maryland Court of Appeals noted Prosser's summary:
the absurdity of a wrong committed by an entire people; ... the very dubious
theory that an agent of the state is always outside of the scope of his authority
and employment when he commits any wrongful act; ... and the inconvenience
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1. The Crown Can Do No Wrong. 9 -A monarch guided by divine,
omniscient providence can perforce do no wrong. Suits against the
crown are therefore unthinkable, because they would thwart God's
will. Perpetuated by Blackstone,' ° this doctrine survived the decline
of royal power and helped clothe the modern democratic state with
sovereign immunity in England and America." The United States
Supreme Court and Maryland Court of Appeals' 2 have explicitly re-
jected this theory, rendering it archaic and of historical interest
only.
2. Impracticality of Suing the Sovereign.-Sovereign immunity
often garners support because no temporal authority is superior to
government; thus, it might seem difficult to fashion a forum in which
the sovereign could be tried.'" The Supreme Court has upheld sov-
ereign immunity "on the logical and practical ground that there can
be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on
and embarrassment which would descend upon the government if it should be
subject to such liability.
Godwin v. County Comm'rs, 256 Md. 326, 332, 260 A.2d 295, 298 (1970) (quoting W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 125, at 1001 (3d ed. 1964)).
According to Blackstone, every monarch needed to be distinguished from the royal
subjects, not only by outward pomp and circumstance, but by "ascribing to him certain
qualities as inherent in his royal capacity, distinct from and superior to those of any
other individual in the nation." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 241 (Garland Pub-
lishing facsimile ed. 1978). As a result, the masses, who are "apt to grow insolent and
refractory," should view the monarch as a "superior being and ... pay him that awful
respect, which may enable him with greater ease to carry on the business of govern-
ment." Id. It appears that neither the United States nor Maryland adopted this theory.
See also Godwin, 256 Md. at 330-31, 260 A.2d at 297 (1970) (quoting BROWNE'S BLACK-
STONE'S COMMENTARIES [W.H. Browne ed. 1941] at 77).
9. This policy, surprisingly, is an historical latecomer. It was only when the feudal
system gave way to the modern state that the crown became the state, "combin[ing]
Divine attributes with temporal authority." R. WATKINS, supra note 7, at 11.
10. Godwin, 256 Md. at 330-31, 260 A.2d at 297 (1970) (quoting BROWNE'S BLACK-
STONE'S COMMENTARIES [W.H. Browne ed. 1941) at 77).
11. R. WATKINS, supra note 7, at 11-12 (England); id. at 51 (America); see also Booth &
Rench, Ex'rs of Swearingen v. United States, 11 G. &J. 373, 376-77 (Md. 1841).
12. Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341, 343 (1879); Katz v. Washington Subur-
ban Sanitary Comm'n, 284 Md. 503, 507, 397 A.2d 1027, 1030 (1979). In the United
States, the impeachment provisions of the Constitution belie the comparable notion that
a President can do no wrong. Langford, 101 U.S. at 343.
13. Roman monarchs and emperors enjoyed personal immunity for this reason dur-
ing their incumbency, though not necessarily thereafter. R. WATKINS, supra note 7, at 2-
4. The early monarchs of England, although they sometimes wrangled "as common
persons in the courts," could not be sued without permission; the crown, as head of the
feudal system, enjoyed the traditional exemption from prosecution in one's own court.
Id. at 6-7. However, Watkins notes that a gross injustice by the crown could be re-
dressed in the crown's own courts. Id. at 8-9 (citing BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ANGLIAE, f. 5
b. ed. Travers Twiss, 1878).
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which the right depends."' 4 However, the modern republican form
of government, with its separation of governmental powers and its
explicit recognition that the people are the source of power, has to a
large extent solved this problem by holding each branch of govern-
ment accountable to the others and to the people.' 5
3. Preservation of Public Assets.-This argument assumes that
government holds its assets as a public trust and may not distribute
them without approval. To permit lawsuits against government,
with concomitant damage awards occasioned by the acts of unau-
thorized wrongdoers, would betray that public trust. Government's
assets under this theory are as crown jewels that must be protected
by the lockbox of sovereign immunity.
An historical variation on this theory is the idea that immunity
from creditors' suits was a practical necessity for the survival of in-
solvent ex-colonies that were trying to form a stable union after the
American Revolution.16 Modern Maryland decisions recognize
preservation of public assets as one of the primary reasons for re-
taining sovereign immunity.' 7
4. Government's Need for Efficiency and Control.-According to this
rationale, the prospect of lawsuits inhibits government personnel in
deciding and acting in the public interest. In 1868 the Supreme
Court pointed out the "inconvenience and danger" that would re-
sult in the absence of sovereign immunity: "It is obvious that the
public service would be hindered, and the public safety endangered,
if the supreme authority could be subjected to suit at the instance of
every citizen, and consequently controlled in the use and disposition
14. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) (Holmes, J.).
15. This system demonstrated its practicality most recently in United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683 (1974), in which the judiciary ordered the chief executive to provide tape
recordings subject to a subpoena in the Watergate affair.
16. R. WATmINS, supra note 7, at 52-54; Austin v. Mayor of Baltimore, 286 Md. 51, 80,
405 A.2d 225, 270 (1979) (Cole, J., dissenting).
17. Katz v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 284 Md. 503, 507, 397 A.2d
1027, 1030 (1979); Duncan v. Koustensis, 260 Md. 98, 102-04, 271 A.2d 547, 549-50
(1970) (sovereign immunity of school board). Indeed, so strong is this policy that the
Court of Appeals uses the danger to public assets as a litmus test in interpreting whether
a statute grants a complete waiver of sovereign immunity. Washington Suburban Sani-
tary Comm'n v. Pride Homes, 291 Md. 537, 545, 435 A.2d 796, 801 (1981). See also infra
notes 56-58 and accompanying text (discussing Pride Homes).
Although at least one decision has posited this "trust fund theory" as an alternative
to "sovereignty in its pristine form," Goldberg v. Howard County Welfare Bd., 260 Md.
351, 355, 272 A.2d 397, 399 (1971), distinguishing the two does not seem profitable in
the present context.
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of the means required for the proper administration of govern-
ment."' I8 The Maryland Court of Appeals has held that "to subject
the state to the coercive control of its own agencies . .. would so
hamper and impede the orderly exercise of its executive and admin-
istrative powers as to prevent the proper and adequate performance
of its governmental functions." 19
5. Judicial Inertia.-Some early Supreme Court decisions offer
no theoretical justification for sovereign immunity but simply assert
its validity as "universally received opinion, "20 as a maxim long es-
tablished and "universally assented to,"21 or as "an established
principle of jurisprudence in all civilized nations."22
B. Statutes of Limitation
Ancient Jewish, Athenian, and Roman law provided in some
form for limitations of actions. 23 Early English common law pro-
vided no exact time limits on actions,24 although certain common-
law doctrines had a practical effect apparently similar to that later
achieved by limitations. 25 English lawmakers took the first halting
steps toward limitations by barring actions that accrued prior to cer-
tain notable events, such as the coronation of a monarch; the effect
of these statutes diminished with each passing year, however, be-
cause actions accruing after the notable event remained unbarred.2 0
England enacted the first modern statute of limitation in
1540.27 A subsequent English act in 162328 entrenched the doctrine
18. The Siren, 74 U.S. 152, 154 (1868).
19. Mayor of Baltimore v. State ex rel. Blueford, 173 Md. 267, 271, 195 A. 571, 573-
74 (1937).
20. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 411-12 (1821).
21. Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. 385, 389 (1850).
22. Beers ex rel. Platenius v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. 527, 529 (1857); see also Godwin v.
County Comm'rs, 256 Md. 326, 332, 260 A.2d 295, 298 (1970).
23. J. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS AT LAW AND SUITS IN
EQUITY AND ADMIRALTY 7 (4th ed. 1861).
24. H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATION OF ACTIONS AT LAW AND IN EQUITY 2
(1883).
25. At common law, the death of either party terminated actions in tort. Developments
in the Law-Statutes of Limitation, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1178 (1950) [hereinafter Develop-
ments in the Law]. Also, nonpayment of a debt for twenty years raised a presumption that
it had been paid, shifting to the plaintiff the burden of establishing nonpayment. H.
WOOD, supra note 24, at 3 n.l. Trial by wager of law, which permitted defendants to
clear themselves by their own oaths and that of eleven compurgators, also operated as a
check on stale claims. Id. at 3, 4 n.1;J. ANGELL, supra note 23, at 15.
26. J. ANGELL, supra note 23, at 11-12; H. WooD, supra note 24, at 4.
27. 32 Hen. 8, ch. 2. See W. FERGUSON, THE STATUTES OF LIMITATION SAVING STAT-
UTES 7 (1978). Although Bracton wrote, "omnes actiones in mundo infra certa tempora limita-
[VOL. 46:408412
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and provided the basic limitations law for Maryland and the rest of
America for more than two centuries. 9 The Supreme Court af-
firmed the constitutionality of American limitations laws in 1827.30
One commentator has noted:
The statute of limitations reflects a decision that the inter-
est of a would-be plaintiff in a remedy is, at some point, less
important than the interest of the threatened defendant in
repose, and that society's interest in compensating victims
is, at some point, less important than society's interest in
closing the books.3'
This passage highlights some of the justifications that have been ad-
vanced for statutes of limitation:
1. Protection of Defendants' Interests.-An early English court
pointed out that "[1]ong dormant claims have often more of cruelty
than ofjustice in them."312 The Maryland Court of Appeals has held
that "the primary consideration underlying statutes of limitations is
tionem habent" (all actions in the world are limited within certain time periods), thus
suggesting a common-law origin for statutes of limitation, Coke maintained that legisla-
tures created the doctrine of limitations. Id. at 9 (citing BACON'S ABRIDGEMENT 461 (G.
William ed. 1811)). See also H. WOOD, supra note 24, at 2 n.7 (contending that the truth
of Bracton's statement is extremely doubtful). 32 Hen. 8, ch. 2 was the first limitations
law to dictate a "fixed interval between the accrual of the right and the commencement
of the action." H. WOOD, supra note 24, at 5.
28. 21 Jac. 1, ch. 16. See also W. FERGUSON, supra note 27, at II (text of statute in
Appendix D, at 515);J. ANGELL, supra note 23, at 12. This was the first English statute to
limit actions on contracts. J. ANGELL, supra note 23, at 13; Williams, The Statute of Limita-
tions, Prospective Warranties, and Problems of Interpretation in Article Two of the UCC, 52 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 67, 69 (1983); Note, Maryland Statutes of Limitation, 8 MD. L. REV. 294, 296
(1944).
29. Central Collection Unit v. Atlantic Container Line, Ltd., 277 Md. 626, 627-28,
356 A.2d 555, 556 (1976);J. ANGELL, supra note 23, at 11, 16; H. WOOD, supra note 24, at
5; Note, supra note 28, at 296.
30. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 348-49 (1827).
31. Williams, supra note 28, at 69-70. The passage concludes: "The statute of limi-
tations operates without regard to the merits of the controversy, and that is its point:
time waits for no one, not even those with meritorious claims." Id. at 70.
32. A'Court v. Cross, 130 Eng. Rep. 540, 541 (1825). Statutes of limitation address
the defendant's overriding need for access to evidence, including live testimony, before
it is lost, destroyed, or forgotten. See W. FERGUSON, supra note 27, at 43. Plaintiffs, of
course, may also benefit from fresh memories and recent evidence, but they determine
when suit is filed; if in the absence of limitations they choose to risk the loss of evidence
by filing years after the wrong, the risk is theirs. See id. at 43-44. See also H. WOOD, supra
note 24, at 7; Williams, supra note 28, at 69-70. This reasoning has been applied to
actions concerning real propertyJ. ANGELL, supra note 23, at 10 ("[iut is unquestionably
the natural tendency of time, to obscure and extinguish the direct evidence of title")
(emphasis in original) and contracts, id. (asserting time's tendency to erase evidence of
debt's discharge).
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one of fairness to the defendant, that he ought not to be called on to
resist a claim when 'evidence has been lost, memories have faded,
and witnesses have disappeared.' "" This policy carries special
weight in criminal proceedings, in which the defendant's life and
liberty depend on the reliability of the evidence.1
4
Further evidence that limitations exist primarily to protect de-
fendants' interests may be found in those cases that permit defend-
ants to lift the bar of limitations by acknowledging or promising to
pay a time-barred debt;3 5 the law would not give defendants such a
waiver power if the purpose of limitations were to protect plaintiffs
or the public.16 Statutes of limitation also protect the reliance inter-
ests of real property owners who build improvements on land.3 7
2. Protection of Public's Interests.-As a side effect, limitations
benefit the public. For example, limitations may be used to quiet
title to real property38 and thus prevent waste.39 Some suggest that
limitations prevent "innumerable and perpetual litigations '"40 and
protect trade and commerce.4
3. Punishment of Plaintffs.-"[T]he indolence of those who are
dilatory in recovering their property, and claiming what is due them,
should be punished," said one nineteenth-century commentator.42
Another has stated that statutes of limitation were "partly estab-
lished for the punishment of the creditor."
43
33. Doughty v. Prettyman, 219 Md. 83, 92-93, 148 A.2d 438, 443 (1959) (quoting
Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944)).
See also Developments in the Law, supra note 25, at 1185 ("The primary consideration un-
derlying [statutes of limitation] is undoubtedly one of fairness to the defendant."). Cf
Reed v. Sweeney, 62 Md. App. 231, 235, 488 A.2d 1016, 1018 (1985) ("the Maryland
cases make it clear that a statute of limitations is designed to protect a potential defend-
ant from 'surprise' actions which inhibit his ability to fashion a defense because of the
litigation's temporal distance from the disputed occurrence").
34. Developments in the Law, supra note 25, at 1186.
35. Note, supra note 28, at 297; see also H. WOOD, supra note 24, at 79.
36. W. FERGUSON, supra note 27, at 43.
37. Id. at 42-43.
38. Pancoast v. Addison, 1 H. &J. 350, 356 (Md. 1802); see also W. FERGUSON, supra
note 27, at 41.
39. J. ANGELL, supra note 23, at 9.
40. Id. at 8; see also Williams, supra note 28, at 69. Cf. Developments in the Law, supra
note 25, at 1185 (citing desire to relieve the courts of the "burden of adjudicating incon-
sequential or tenuous claims").
41. H. WOOD, supra note 24, at 2-3 n.7; see also Developments in the Law, supra note 25,
at 1185.
42. J. ANGELL, supra note 23, at 8.
43. H. WOOD, supra note 24, at 7.
414 [VOL. 46:408
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C. Nullum Tempus
The doctrine that time does not run against the crown is an
"ancient maxim of the common law." '44 The Supreme Court has ob-
served that the true reason for nullum tempus is "the great public pol-
icy of preserving the public rights, revenues, and property from
injury and loss, by the negligence of public officers."" 5 In other
words, government's tardiness in filing suits should not prevent the
augmentation of public assets through recovery of judgments in
court. Another Supreme Court opinion has suggested that if a law-
suit is filed late, it is because "the king is always busied for the pub-
lic good, and, therefore, has not leisure to assert his right within the
times limited to subjects.""6 In Maryland, the Court of Appeals has
said, "the doctrine that limitations do not run against the State
stems from the theory of sovereign immunity."" 7 Thus, each argu-
ment accepted in Maryland in favor of sovereign immunity also sup-
ports nullum tempus.
III. NULLUM TEMPUS: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE
In the simplest situation, a statute overrules the common law by
expressly subjecting government to limitations.48 Absent such a
statute, the common law frees government from obeying statutes of
limitation." However, when sovereign immunity is absent or
waived for government-defendants, a reciprocal waiver of immunity
from limitations occurs for government-plaintiffs in that particular
44. J. ANGELL, supra note 23, at 30; see also H. WOOD, supra note 24, at 89 n.l, 92.
England modified the doctrine with 21 Jac. 1, ch. 5 and 9 Geo. 3, ch. 16, which set sixty-
year limits on the crown's rights to recover various interests in real property. J. ANGELL,
supra note 23, at 30-31; H. WOOD, supra note 24, at 89 n.i.
When suing in state court, the federal government is clothed with the state's immu-
nity from limitations. See Central Collection Unit v. Atlantic Container Line, Ltd., 277
Md. 626, 628, 356 A.2d 555, 556-57 (1976); Booth & Rench, Ex'rs of Swearingen v.
United States, I G. &J. at 373, 377 (Md. 1841). Sureties subrogated to the state's right
to collect debt are also immune from limitations. American Bonding Co. v. National
Mechanics Bank, 97 Md. 598, 607, 55 A. 395, 398 (1903); see also Atlantic Container, 277
Md. at 628-29, 356 A.2d at 557; cf. Orem v. Wrightson, 51 Md. 34, 46 (1879) (surety
subrogated to state's rights of priority in debt collection).
45. United States v. Hoar, 26 F. Cas. 329, 330 (C.C.D. Mass. 1821) (No. 15,373)
(Story, J.).
46. Hoar, 26 F. Cas. at 330.
47. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. Pride Homes, Inc., 291 Md. 537, 544,
435 A.2d 796, 801 (1981).
48. J. ANGELL, supra note 23, at 31; H. WOOD, supra note 24, at 88-89. See, e.g., infra
notes 81-107 and accompanying text (discussing criminal actions and tax collection).
49. Nor are laches imputable to the government. J. ANGELL, supra note 23, at 32; H.
WOOD, supra note 24, at 91.
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type of case. The case of Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission v.
Pride Homes, Inc. ,50 illustrates this reciprocity principle.
A. The Pride Homes Decision
In Pride Homes the Maryland Court of Appeals held that, despite
a legislative waiver of immunity from lawsuits, a state agency re-
tained its immunity from the defense of limitations. The sanitary
commission sued Pride Homes in tort, after normal limitations had
expired, for piling dirt twenty feet deep over a right-of-way ease-
ment owned by the commission. The dirt pile had fractured a sewer
line and caused sewage backups in houses. Pride Homes asserted
limitations as a defense,5 ' arguing that the commission lost sover-
eign immunity-including immunity from limitations-when its
code was changed to provide a source of money to satisfy judgments
and fund settlements in suits against it.5 2
Because sovereign immunity is of such fundamental impor-
tance, reasoned the court, waivers of immunity must be strictly con-
strued. Nowhere in the waiver of the commission's immunity could
the Court of Appeals find any "indication of an intent to waive the
attribute of sovereignty relative to limitations."5 3 Absent such an
intent or an explicit waiver, nullum tempus governed, 4 allowing the
commission to pursue its action against Pride Homes despite having
filed suit after the limitations period had expired.
While denying the plaintiff relief in this case, the court strongly
implied that a more extensive waiver of sovereign immunity might
include a limitations waiver, even without explicit mention. The
court first stressed that such waivers hnust emanate from the legisla-
ture, either expressly or by necessary implication.55 The court then
contrasted the waiver in the sanitary commission's code-which sim-
50. 291 Md. 537, 435 A.2d 796 (1981).
51. The opinion does not reveal how long after the limitation deadline the suit was
filed. Id.
52. Id. at 542-44, 435 A.2d at 799-800. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 29, § 1-201 (1986)
for the codification of the Washington Suburban Sanitary District Code cited in Pride
Homes.
53. 291 Md. at 544-45, 435 A.2d at 801.
54. See Ulman v. Charles St. Ave. Co., 83 Md. 130, 145, 34 A. 366, 369 (1896) (time
runs against the state " 'only where the State or public are expressly included' ") (quot-
ing Tainter v. Mayor of Morristown, 19 N.J. Eq. 46, 59-60 (1868)).
55. 291 Md. at 542-44, 435 A.2d at 799-800. See also Bradshaw v. Prince George's
County, 284 Md. 294, 300, 396 A.2d 255, 259 (1979) ("any waiver of immunity must
emanate from the legislature"). Neither the state nor its agencies may waive sovereign
immunity by failing to plead the defense. Board of Educ. v. Alcrymat Corp., 258 Md.
508, 516, 266 A.2d 349, 353 (1970).
[VOL. 46:408416
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ply provided a means of collecting funds to defend suits-with the
legislative waiver of sovereign immunity as a defense to contract ac-
tions against the state.56 The sanitary commission waiver, the court
stated, is a "far cry" from the contract waiver. The contract waiver
requires the state to budget sufficient funds to cover judgments,57
whereas the commission's waiver provides only a means of requesting
such funds from a county council.5" By using the contract waiver as
a model of breadth, the court implied that in contract cases the leg-
islature must have contemplated waiving sovereign immunity rela-
tive to limitations as well as immunity from lawsuits.
Pride Homes shows the rigid link between sovereign immunity
and statutes of limitation embodied in nullum tempus. "[T]he doc-
trine that limitations do not run against the State stems from the
theory of sovereign immunity," declared the court.59 Thus, sover-
eign immunity provides the foundation for nullum tempus. When sov-
ereign immunity has been waived, nullum tempus ceases to apply, and
government will be bound by statutes of limitation. The doctrine of
nullum tempus may thus be termed a reciprocity theory, since a waiver
of sovereign immunity engenders a reciprocal waiver of immunity
from limitations whenever government is a plaintiff in the type of
action in which its immunity as a defendant has been waived.6 °
In order to know whether limitations bind a government-plain-
tiff, therefore, the practitioner must determine whether immunity
has been waived for government-defendants in the particular type of
action being litigated. The following sections review the status of
immunity for nullum tempus purposes in various categories of actions.
When statutes of limitation expressly bind government, that too is
noted.
B. Guide by Category of Case
1. Contracts.-The state is forbidden by statute from raising
the defense of sovereign immunity in suits "based on a written con-
56. MD. STATE Gov'T. CODE ANN. §§ 12-201 through 12-204 (1984 & Supp. 1986).
57. "To carry out this subtitle, the Governor shall include in the budget bill money
that is adequate to satisfy a final judgment that ... is rendered against the State." Id. at
§ 12-203 (Supp. 1986).
58. 291 Md. at 545, 435 A.2d at 801: "As we recognized in Katz [v. Washington Subur-
ban Sanitary Comm'n, 284 Md. 503, 397 A.2d 1027 (1979)], an individual may recover a
judgment against the Commission but not be able to collect upon it because the county
council may not see fit to put the funds in the budget."
59. 291 Md. at 544, 435 A.2d at 801.
60. Nullum tempus is also defeated when sovereign immunity is absent in the first
place, rather than waived. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
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tract that an official or employee executed for the State or 1 of its
units while the official or employee was acting within the scope of
the authority of the official or employee."'" Similar immunity waiv-
ers apply to counties,62 and the code requires counties to fund judg-
ments. 6' According to Pride Homes, discussed above, these waivers
are probably sufficient to defeat nullum tempus.6'
Since waivers of immunity are to be strictly construed, these
statutes leave sovereign immunity intact for contract actions (1) not
in writing, (2) not executed by a state official or employee, or (3) not
executed in the scope of authority.65
The practitioner may also need to determine whether a lawsuit
is "based on a written contract" when government seeks special
remedies emanating from the legislature rather than from contract
language. This category of statutes includes the limitation on the
time for holders of certificates of sale to foreclose their rights of
redemption;66 for health insurance issuers to attempt to void poli-
cies for negligent misstatements by the insureds;6" for buyers of mo-
61. MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 12-201(a) (Supp. 1986).
62. MD. ANN. CODE art. 25, § IA (1981 & Supp. 1986) (commission counties); id. at
art. 25A, § IA (chartered counties); id. at art. 25B, § 13A (code counties).
63. Id. at art. 25, § lA(d) (Supp. 1986) (commission counties); id. at art. 25A,
§ IA(d) (chartered counties); id. at art. 25B, § 13A(d) (code counties).
64. The contract waiver did retain immunity from suits for punitive damages, MD.
STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 12-201(b) (Supp. 1986); the practical effect of this retention is
debatable, however, since Maryland courts cannot grant punitive damages in pure
breach of contract actions. Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 278 Md. 524, 529, 366 A.2d
7, 11 (1976).
The contract situation is not without its anomalies, however. Contract suits often
include unjust enrichment counts, from which government still retains immunity; thus,
were the government to file, beyond the three-year limit, a two-count suit in contract
and unjust enrichment, the court would be constrained to dismiss the contract count
while retaining the unjust enrichment count. See Mass Transit Admin. v. Granite Constr.
Co., 57 Md. App. 766, 780-81, 471 A.2d 1121, 1128 (1984).
Also, under the common law, local governments exercising governmental functions
are liable for breach of contract damages only up to the time of cancellation; in other
words, consequential damages are denied to private suitors. Leese v. Baltimore County,
64 Md. App. 442, 477-78, 497 A.2d 159, 177-78 (1985). Unless the government were to
request prebreach and postbreach damages in separate counts, a court would have to
reject a limitations defense by a private defendant against a contract claim asking for
both types of damage. Why? Because under nullum tempus, private defendants cannot
plead limitations in causes of action to which the government is immune from suit. This
raises a curious question: Could the court force the government to amend its pleading
and bifurcate the damage claims, so that the private defendant could successfully plead
limitations as a defense to the claim for prebreach damages? See also infra notes 77 & 80.
65. Leese, 64 Md. App. at 478-79, 497 A.2d at 177-78.
66. Two years from the date of the certificate of sale. MD. TAX-PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 14-833 (1986 & Supp. 1986).
67. Two years from policy issuance date. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 441 (1986).
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tor vehicles to sue for violations of the Automotive Warranty
Enforcement Act;68 for tenants to sue landlords for charging exces-
sive security deposits; 69 and for policy holders to sue insurance
companies for failure to pay claims.70 This category also includes
limitations on time to sue for violations of the Maryland Securities
Act;7 1 violations of the Credit Grantor Revolving Credit Provi-
sions; 72 violations of the Credit Grantor Closed End Credit Provi-
sions; 73 as well as suits for usury. 74
2. Torts.-The Maryland Tort Claims Act 75 waives the state's
immunity from suit for nonintentional torts and provides as effective
a guarantee of funding for judgments as is provided under the con-
tract waiver. 76 Under the Pride Homes mandatory funding test, there-
fore, the Maryland Tort Claims Act appears to waive sovereign
immunity so thoroughly as to evidence a legislative intent that limi-
tations be waived reciprocally for that same kind of action. 77
The legislature permits chartered counties to waive sovereign
immunity,18 but by and large, counties retain immunity when exer-
68. Three years from date of original delivery of vehicle. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN.
§ 14-1501(1) (Supp. 1986).
69. Two years from termination of tenancy. Id. at § 8-203(b)(3) (1981).
70. Three years from due date of written proof of loss. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A,
§ 450 (1986).
71. Three years from sale or purchase of security, or one year from certain other
violations or discoveries, whichever is earlier. MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 11-
703(f) (1985).
72. Six months from date credit extension repaid in full. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN.
§ 12-919 (1983).
73. Six months from satisfaction of loan. Id. at § 12-1019.
74. Six months from satisfaction of loan. Id. at § 12-111.
75. MD. STATE GoV'T CODE ANN. §§ 12-101 through 12-109 (1984 & Supp. 1986).
76. The Tort Claims Act waives immunity to judgments "to the extent of insurance
coverage" under the State Insurance Program. Id. at § 12-104(a) (Supp. 1986). The
State Insurance Program, MD. STATE FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 9-101 through 9-107
(1985)), provides in turn that claims under the Tort Claims Act shall be insured "[t]o the
extent that funds are available in the State budget." Id. at § 9-105(c). The State Insur-
ance Program statute makes it clear that the General Assembly requires that the budget
provide for the necessary insurance. See id. at § 9-102(b)(1) (stating intent to insure as
fully as permitted by law); § 9-103(b)(3) (stating intent that the state budget include
sufficient appropriations to provide sufficient reserves to cover losses under § 9-105(c),
which provides for payments under the Tort Claims Act).
77. If a government agency were to sue out-of-time in two counts, one for negli-
gence and one for intentional interference with contractual relations, would the court
deny defendant's plea of limitations on the intentional tort count, which requires malice
(immunity not waived), but grant a plea of limitations on the negligence count (immu-
nity waived)? See also supra note 64, infra note 80.
78. MD. ANN. CODE art. 25A, § 5(CC) (1981).
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cising governmental functions.79 Thus, the practitioner must again
try to determine whether the government-plaintiff is suing on a
cause of action for which immunity has been waived for govern-
ment-defendants.80
3. Criminal Actions.-The legislature has expressly bound gov-
ernment with limitations periods ranging from thirty days to five
years for a variety of criminal actions,81 including prosecutions for
Sabbath-breaking and drunkenness; 82 the collections of any fine,
penalty, or forfeiture;83 misdemeanors not punishable by confine-
ment in the penitentiary;8 4 unlawful use of driver's license or using
false name when applying for driver's license;85 extortion;86 viola-
tions of certain election laws, conflict of interest laws, criminal mal-
feasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance in office of government
officers, or conspiracy to commit any of these offenses;8 7 welfare of-
fenses and Medicaid fraud;88 violations of the Equal Pay Act;89 un-
employment insurance laws;9" income tax laws; 1 and antitrust
provisions. 2 Another statute limits the time for the state executive
to commence proceedings to extradite a person of unsound mind.93
79. See infra notes 129-40 and accompanying text.
80. If in the same suit a county sued a private defendant out-of-time for negligence
(immunity not waived) and breach of contract (immunity waived), would the court be
bound to deny a plea of limitations on the negligence count while granting it on the
contract count? See supra notes 64 & 77 and accompanying text.
81. Many crimes, including murder, rape, and robbery, have no limitations period,
and thus prosecutions may be brought at any time. State v. Brown, 21 Md. App. 91, 93
n.3, 318 A.2d 257, 259 n.3 (1974).
82. Thirty days from date of offense. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-106(c).
A 30-day limit is also provided for certain alcoholic beverage sale offenses in Allegany
County. Id. at § 5-106(d).
83. One year from date of offense. Id. at § 5-107.
84. One year from date of offense. Id. at § 5-106(a).
85. Two years from date of offense. Id. at § 5-106(b).
86. Five years from date of offense for extortion generally, MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 562B (1982), extortion by state or local officer or employee generally, id. at § 562C,
and extortion by state or local officer or employee against another such employee, id. at
§ 562D.
87. Two years from date of offense. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-106(e)-(f)
(1984).
88. Three years from date of offense. Id. at § 5-106 (g)-(h).
89. Three years from date of offense. MD. CODE ANN. art. 100, § 55D(b) (1985).
90. Three years from date of offense. Id. at art. 95A, § 17(g).
91. Three years from date of offense. Id. at art. 81, § 321.
92. Four years from date of offense. MD. CoM. Law CODE ANN. § 11-207(d) (1983).
93. One year from flight to another jurisdiction. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 2-305
(1986).
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4. Tax Collection and Related Activities.-The legislature has also
imposed limitations on government ranging from one to seven years
in areas related to collection of taxes, including the making of prop-
erty tax assessments or abatements; 94 sale of property at tax sale;
95
collection of tax after a receiver or trustee is appointed;96 assess-
ment of additional taxes due;97 collection of tax on escaped prop-
erty;9 8 actions to recover motor vehicle fuel tax;9 9 suits for retail
sales taxes' 00 and use taxes; t 'O suits for tax assessed within applica-
ble assessment limitation;'0 2 collection of property taxes;' 03 actions
to collect tax imposed within seven-year limit for making assess-
ments;104 and suits for taxes when no other limitations are pro-
vided,'0 5 including situations when receivers or trustees have been
appointed to complete collection within the first seven years.' 0 6 An-
other statute extends the time for bringing collection actions when
one's civil defense activities have interfered with the ability to file
one's tax return.1
07
5. Real Property.-Nullum tempus probably holds government
immune from statutes of limitation designed to ensure the reliability
of the land record system. At issue are statutes imposing time limits
for commencing judicial proceedings to challenge formal requisites
94. One year after report of assessment or abatement is filed, or one year after due
date of such report, whichever is later. MD. TAX-PROP. CODE ANN. § 14-1103(c) (1986 &
Supp. 1986).
95. Two years from date of tax arrearage. Id. at § 14-808(a) (1986). The limit in St.
Mary's and Calvert counties is one year. Id. at § 14-808(b).
96. Two years from date of appointment of trustee or receiver, if collector previously
failed to collect tax and if receiver or trustee was appointed within seven-year period
specified in MD. TAX-PROP. CODE ANN. § 14-1101(a) (1986). Id. at § 14-1101(c).
97. Three years from due date or filing date of tax return, whichever is later. MD.
ANN. CODE art. 81, § 309 (1980).
98. Tax may be collected for no more than three years prior to placement on tax
rolls. MD. TAX-PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 8-417(c) (1986), 14-1103(b) (Supp. 1986).
99. Four years from due date. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, §§ 135, 154(a) (1983).
100. Four years from due date. Id. at art. 81, § 342(a).
101. Four years from due date. Id. at § 393.
102. Seven years from date of assessment. Id. at § 212(c) (Supp. 1986).
103. Seven years from due date. MD. TAX-PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 14-864, 14-1101(a)
(1986 & Supp. 1986).
104. Seven years from date tax imposed. Id. at § 14-1101(b) (1986). The limitations
period for imposing the taxes in the first place is found in id. at § 14-1101(a).
105. Seven years from due date. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 212 (Supp. 1986).
106. Seven years from due date, with extension of two years from date of trustee or
receiver appointment. Id. at § 212(a).
107. The limitations period is extended for nine months plus the length of the civil
defense emergency period. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16A, § 27 (1981 & Supp. 1986).
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of a granting instrument;'l 8 for contingency to occur creating possi-
bility of reverter; 1 9 for commencing an action to recover land or
enter on it due to breach of condition or termination of a fee-simple
determinable estate;" 0 for landlord to claim rent or reversion of
property when rent goes unpaid;"' and for buyer not in possession
of land to commence action under a recorded contract against one
not a party to the contract.'12
A line of cases holds that the state is not subject to adverse pos-
session.' ' 3 These cases do not endanger the reliability of the land
record system, however, because they tend to preserve land record
titles in government's name, even though private citizens in the
same situation would have to yield the land under adverse
possession.
6. Miscellaneous. -Under the nullum tempus doctrine, govern-
ment will normally be exempt from any limitations statute that is
silent on the issue; hence, the legislature seldom includes explicit
exemptions. Nevertheless, certain statutes explicitly exempt gov-
ernment from limitation periods that apply to private parties. Mary-
land law first provided such an exemption in 1715.14 Current law
108. Six months from date of recordation. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 4-109(b)
(1981).
109. Thirty years from effective date of instrument creating possibility of reverter or
condition. Id. at § 6-101(b).
110. Seven years from date of breach of condition or termination of fee-simple deter-
minable estate. Id. at § 6-103.
111. Twenty years from last demand for or payment of rent under a lease. Id. at § 8-
107.
112. Five years from date of delivery set out in deed, or, if no delivery date in deed,
from date when final installment of purchase price was to be paid under deed. Id. at
§ 10-401. Another provision of this section states that the disability of either party does
not extend the five-year period. The policy of making the land records reliable seems
paramount here. Because this would qualify as a suit on a contract, government would
probably be bound by limitations. See infra notes 61-74 and accompanying text.
113. Hall v. Gittings, 2 H. &J. 112, 114 (Md. 1806); Bond v. Murray, 118 Md. 445,
452-53, 84 A. 655, 658-59 (1912). See also Central Collection Unit v. Atlantic Container
Line, Ltd., 277 Md. 626, 629, 356 A.2d 555, 557 (1976). Private parties must file actions
for "recovery of possession of a corporeal freehold or leasehold estate in land" or to
enter on the land within twenty years from when the cause of action accrues. MD. CTS. &
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-103(a) (1984). See also infra note 132 and accompanying text.
114. 1715 Md. Laws ch. 23, sec. 6:
That no bill, bondjudgment, . . . or other specialty whatsoever, except such as
shall be taken in the name or for the use of our sovereign Lord the King, his
heirs and successors, shall be good . . . after the principal debtor and creditor
have been both dead twelve years, or the debt or thing in action above twelve
years standing ....
See also Note, supra note 28, at 294.
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provides exemptions for the state's efforts to acquire abandoned
property in federal custody in the state;" 5 as well as to file actions
on specialties" 6 and public officers' bonds."
17
By statute, certain government agencies have a limited time to
file civil actions, including suits for any fine, penalty, or forfeiture;"'
violations of the Equal Pay Act;" 9 enforcement of antitrust provi-
sions;' 20 and suits to enforce liens for the value of public defender
services. '
2
'
Raising peculiar questions of their own are the statutes limiting
enforcement of civil or criminal penalties under the Public Informa-
tion Act,122 the abandonment of condemnation proceedings,' 23 and
the commencement of contempt of court proceedings against a per-
115. MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 17-208 (1983). The normal limitations period is 90
days. Id. at § 17-206(a)(2) (1983).
116. MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-102(c) (1984). "Specialties" include prom-
issory notes or other instruments under seal, bonds (except a public officer's bond),
judgments, recognizances, contracts under seal, or "any other specialty." The normal
limitations period is twelve years. Id. at § 5-102(a). See also infra text accompanying
notes 132-34.
117. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-104(b) (1984). The normal limitations
period is five years. Id. at § 5-104(a).
118. One year from date of offense. Id. at § 5-107 (1984).
119. Three years from date of offense. MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 55D(b) (1985).
120. Four years from date cause of action accrues. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-
209(c) (1983).
121. Ten years from filing of lien. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27A, § 7(d) (1983).
122. Two years from the date on which cause of action arises. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 5-110 (1984). This statutory limit applies to actions arising under MD.
STATE Gov'T CODE ANN. § 10-623 (1984), which permits a governmental unit or private
party to file a complaint against another governmental unit if denied the right to inspect
documents under the Act. Governmental plaintiffs must obey this limitations period for
two reasons: (1) Since only a governmental entity can be a defendant, the limitations
clause must have been enacted specifically to protect government-defendants from stale
claims; therefore, this particular limitations statute has a special status not possessed by
most other statutes, which usually apply to private parties. (2) Since the Act by its terms
subjects government to lawsuits, and since there is no question of a fund for judgments,
a complete waiver has occurred; under the Pride Homes reciprocity principle, therefore,
immunity to pleas of limitations also has been waived.
123. One hundred and twenty days from the entry of final judgment or the receipt of
an appeals court mandate or abandonment of appeal. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 12-
109(d)(2)-(3) (1981). MD. R. U4.a. (1986) allows governmental entities and private par-
ties to be plaintiffs in condemnation proceedings; hence, the statute of limitations ap-
plies to both types of plaintiff and cannot be said to apply only to government. Under
the doctrine of Pride Homes, therefore, government may be immune. On the other hand,
the legislature surely had in mind when passing the statute that government dominates
the field of eminent domain; thus, the statute was probably intended to apply to govern-
ment. However, waivers of sovereign immunity must be explicit, Washington Suburban
Sanitary Comm'n v. Pride Homes, 291 Md. 537, 544, 435 A.2d 796, 800-01 (1976), so
the courts could refuse to apply the statute to governmental plaintiffs.
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son defaulting on payment of periodic child or spousal support. 12 4
In causes of action in which sovereign immunity survives for
government-defendants, government-plaintiffs need not obey the
general three-year limitation on civil actions not covered by specific
statutes.' 25 Government is probably also excused from limitations
on actions for violations of the fine prints provisions, 126 submission
of proof of claim for proceeds of sale of property sold by state po-
lice, 1 27 and filing claims against bulk sale transferees.t 2s
7. Local Governments Exercising Proprietary Functions.-Local gov-
ernments129 exercising "governmental" functions possess sovereign
immunity; those exercising "proprietary" functions lack sovereign
immunity.'" 0 It follows from nullum tempus that the former have im-
munity from limitations,'' while the latter lack such immunity.
Thus, when a statute relieves the state from limitations without
exempting local government, such as in cases of adverse posses-
sion, 13 2 suits on public officers' bonds, 33 and actions on special-
124. Three years from date each installment of support becomes due and remains
unpaid. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-111 (1984). Compare MD. FAM. LAW
CODE ANN. § 10-102 (1984), which is virtually identical to this statute. MD. R. P4 (1986)
allows contempt proceedings to be brought by the court or by a private party, and under
the Pride Homes doctrine a governmental plaintiffwould not be bound. Yet,just as in the
case of eminent domain, government is probably the dominant plaintiff in this field, and
thus the legislative intent was likely to place a time limit on government. However,
waivers must be explicit.
125. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-101 (1984).
126. One year from discovery of violation or three years from sale of fine prints,
whichever is longer. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 14-505(c) (1983).
127. Three years from date of sale. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88B, § 27 (1985).
128. Six months from date transferee takes possession of goods. MD. COM. LAW CODE
ANN. § 6-111 (1975).
129. The governmental/proprietary distinction does not apply to the state, only to
counties, municipalities, and their agencies. Austin v. Mayor of Baltimore, 286 Md. 51,
53, 405 A.2d 255, 256 (1979).
130. It is not the case that sovereign immunity is waived when a proprietary function
is undertaken by a local government; rather, in such a case sovereign immunity never
existed. Thus, the reciprocity principle of Pride Homes, see supra notes 48-60 and accom-
panying text, does not apply, since it was enunciated to cover waivers of immunity. A
governmental entity exercising proprietary functions is treated by the courts like any
private party. The significance of this point in litigation is that a defendant who pleads
limitations against government based on an absence of sovereign immunity can bypass
the confusing issues raised by Pride Homes in applying nullum tempus to partial waivers of
immunity. See supra notes 64, 77, & 80.
131. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Howard County Welfare Bd., 260 Md. 351, 358, 272 A.2d
397, 400-01 (1971) (quoting 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 412 (1964)).
132. Land held by a local government in its governmental capacity may not be taken
by adverse possession. Siejack v. Mayor of Baltimore, 270 Md. 640, 644, 313 A.2d 843,
846 (1974); Desch v. Knox, 253 Md. 307, 312, 252 A.2d 815, 818 (1969); Mayor of
Baltimore v. Chesapeake Marine Ry. Co., 233 Md. 559, 572, 197 A.2d 821, 827 (1964).
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ties, 3 4 local governments exercising proprietary functions remain
subject to limitations. A statute of limitations will bar a suit to en-
force private (i.e., non-"governmental") rights, even when brought
derivatively by a municipality' or by a court-appointed receiver. 136
It is still necessary, however, for the practitioner to determine
when a governmental unit is operating in a proprietary capacity.
Maryland jurists have repeatedly criticized the governmen-
tal/proprietary distinction.'3 7 Its fatal weakness is that no satisfac-
tory definition of the distinction has ever been advanced;
consequently, the test is "unsatisfactory and illogical."' l3 8
I can think of no reason whatsoever why the operation of a
park, swimming pool or camp should be deemed "govern-
mental," thereby relieving the City of liability for its negli-
gence, whereas the construction and maintenance of public
streets, bridges and sewers, or the removal of garbage, or
the supplying of water to homes, should all be classified as
"proprietary" with governmental liability for negligence
.... There simply is no rational basis for this classification
of the operations of local government. 3 '
Prior to litigation, it is often difficult to tell whether a particular
function is proprietary or governmental, although cases from other
jurisdictions may be helpful. 140 Once it becomes clear, however,
that an entity lacks sovereign immunity because it engages in a pro-
By contrast, land held by a municipal corporation for private purposes is subject to ad-
verse possession. Siejack, 270 Md. at 644, 313 A.2d at 846; 10 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW
OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 28.55 (3d ed. 1981); 2 CJ.S. Adverse Possession § 20
(1972); 3 Am. JUR. 2D Adverse Possession § 106 (1986).
Adverse possession simply means the successful occupation of land by a nonowner
beyond the time set by the statute of limitations for owners to bring an action to recover
their interest. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-103 (1984).
133. Five years from date of bond is the normal limitations period, from which the
state is explicitly exempted. MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-104 (1984).
134. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
135. Gloyd v. Talbott, 221 Md. 179, 186, 156 A.2d 665, 668 (1959).
136. Kluckhuhn v. Ivy Hill Ass'n, 55 Md. App. 41, 48-49, 461 A.2d 16, 21 (1983).
This is true even when the receiver is an agent not of local but of state government, so
long as private rights are being enforced. Id.
137. Tadjer v. Montgomery County, 300 Md. 539, 554-55, 479 A.2d 1321, 1329
(1984) (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Austin v. Mayor of Balti-
more, 286 Md. 51, 67, 405 A.2d 255, 263 (1979) (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); id. at 83-85, 405 A.2d at 272-73 (Cole, J., dissenting).
138. Austin, 286 Md. at 72, 405 A.2d at 266 (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
139. Id.
140. See 2 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 10.01-.05 (3d ed.
1979).
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prietary function, it follows from the doctrine of nullum tempus that
statutes of limitation will bind such an entity when it sues private
parties.
IV. IRRELEVANCE OF IMMUNITY
A number of statutes closely resemble statutes of limitation but
yet are something different; these non-claim statutes, discussed at A
below, are pre-conditions of suit, and their time limits apply to gov-
ernment irrespective of sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity is
irrelevant to the application of many other statutes, discussed at B
below, because government cannot assume the role of plaintiff in
suits governed by the statute.
A. Non-Claim Statutes
The time limits set by non-claim statutes bind government.
Although resembling statutes of limitation, non-claim statutes differ
because they constitute conditions precedent to filing suit. The ex-
piration of the time limit in a non-claim statute extinguishes all of
the claimant's rights; when the time limit in a statute of limitations
expires, the right to sue remains, although the claimant's remedy-
the ability to file suit in a particular court-is lost because of the
failure to sue. Courts frequently state that a non-claim statute "ex-
tinguishes the right to sue and not merely the remedy."''
Government apparently must obey the time limits set by the fol-
lowing non-claim statutes: to file a petition for allowance of a claim,
or to commence an action against the personal representative of an
estate;142 to file a claim against a decedent's estate;' 43 to file a claim
against a decedent's estate based on conduct of or contract with a
personal representative;1 44 and to bring an action against a personal
141. Donnally v. Montgomery County Welfare Bd., 200 Md. 534, 541, 92 A.2d 354,
357 (1952).
142. Sixty days from the mailing of the notice of disallowance by the personal repre-
sentative. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 8-107(b) (1974).
143. Six months from the first appointment of a personal representative. Id. at § 8-
103(a). This statute is ineffective, however, when "otherwise expressly provided by stat-
ute with respect to claims of the United States and the state." Id. The fifth paragraph of
the official comment states that claims of the state "based on other statutes, such as tax
statutes" are intended to be excluded from the six-month limitation.
144. Six months from date claim arises. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 8-103(c)
(1974). If the suit is on a contract, the contract waiver discussed in Washington Subur-
ban Sanitary Comm'n v. Pride Homes, Inc., 291 Md. 537, 435 A.2d 796 (1981), supra
notes 61-74 and accompanying text, may apply.
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representative. 45 The statute limiting the time for a cause of action
to arise for contribution or indemnity from an architect, profes-
sional engineer, or contractor for damages from the defective and
unsafe condition of an improvement to real property 46 also seems
to bind government, as does the statute limiting the time for a cause
of action to arise for damages from the defective and unsafe condi-
tion of an improvement to real property.'
47
B. Plaintiff Status Limited to Private Parties
Many limitations statutes apply to actions that can probably be
brought only by private parties; in these situations, the question of
government's immunity from a limitations defense becomes irrele-
vant. These actions include suits under the Maryland Torts Claims
Act 14' and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. 149 Also included are
suits by owners of private property against railroads for damages
from laying of track;'5 ° for violations of the Consumer Credit Re-
porting Agencies provisions;" l under the Wrongful Death Act;' 52
against a county, town, or city for damages from riots or tumultuous
assemblages;' for claims of erroneous tax assessment of prop-
erty;' 5 4 for a refund of an advance payment of property tax;' 55 for
claims for property tax, recordation tax, or transfer tax;' 56 for re-
145. One year from close of estate. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 10-103(a)
(1974).
146. Ten years from date the entire improvement first becomes available for its in-
tended use. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-108(b) (1984).
The interaction of this statute with nullum tempus gives rise to an anomaly. Unlike
private plaintiffs, the government might not be barred by the accompanying three-year
limitation on bringing suits. Id. at § 5-108(c). Thus, so long as the government's claim
arises within the ten years, it might have literallyforever to sue on the claim. For example,
this reasoning might affect the government's ability to maintain suits against builders
and subcontractors for asbestos removal.
147. Twenty years from date entire improvement first becomes available for its in-
tended use. Id. at § 5-108(a).
148. One year from denial of claim or three years from date cause of action arises,
whichever is later. MD. STATE Gov'T CODE ANN. § 12-106(b)(3) (Supp. 1986).
149. One year from date of violation. MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 12-707(g) (1983).
150. Two years from completion of tracks. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 199 (1981).
151. Two years from discovery of misrepresentation or two years from date on which
liability arose, whichever ends later. MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. § 14-1214 (1983).
152. Three years from death of injured person. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 3-904(g) (1984 & Supp. 1986).
153. Three years from "time of accrual." MD. ANN. CODE art. 82, § 2 (1980).
154. One year from date of finality of erroneous assessment. MD. TAX-PROP. CODE
ANN. § 14-915(4) (1986 & Supp. 1986).
155. One year from date property tax rate is fixed. Id. at § 14-915(5).
156. Three years from date of payment. Id. at § 14-915(l)-(3).
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fund of mistaken payment of special taxes, fees, and charges; 5 7 and
claims for refund of retail sales taxes.15 8
In a significant number of cases, the question whether a govern-
mental entity may sue under the statute is problematic. This is true
with regard to the limitations statutes for filing actions for assault,
battery, libel, or slander; 159 to claim payment for loss or damage
from omission or error in filing, recording, or indexing of a security
interest in a motor vehicle;' 61 to file claims for compensation for
removal of property, dead bodies, markers, or monuments through
condemnation actions;' 6 1 to file a petition to invalidate a final de-
cree of adoption because of procedural or jurisdictional defect; 1 62 to
file an action for damages against a health care provider for injury
arising out of rendering or failing to render professional services;16 3
to give notice of a claim against a county or municipal corporation
for unliquidated damages for injury to person or property;'" to file
mechanic's lien proceedings;' 65 to file a petition to enforce a
mechanic's lien;' 6 6 to commence action under express and implied
warranty statutes for newly constructed housing units; 167 to sue for
warranty enforcement under the Maryland Condominium Act;'6 8
157. Three years from date of payment. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 215 (1980).
158. Four years from date of payment. Id. at § 348 (Supp. 1986).
159. One year from accrual of cause of action. MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-
105 (1984).
160. Three years from date cause of action arose. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 13-
210(a) (1984).
161. Six months from removal of property, dead body, marker, or monument. MD.
REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 12-112(a) (1981). The limitations period is one year for peti-
tioners to claim a pecuniary allowance for such a removal. Id. at § 12-112(h).
162. One year from entry of final decree. MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 5-325 (1984).
163. Five years from time of injury, or three years from date injury is discovered,
whichever "is the shorter." MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-109 (1984). Since
three years is always a "shorter" period than five years, the General Assembly probably
meant to state, "whichever period ends first."
164. One hundred and eighty days from date of injury. Id. at § 5-306(a) (1984 &
Supp. 1986).
165. One hundred and eighty days from date work finished or material was furnished.
MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 9-105(a) (1981).
166. One year from date petition to establish the lien was filed. Id. at § 9-109 (1981).
167. Two years from date defect was or should have been discovered, or two years
from expiration of warranty, whichever comes first. Id. at § 10-204 (1981 & Supp.
1986). This statute does not refer to "consumers" but merely to purchasers of newly
constructed dwelling units.
168. One year from end of warranty period. Id. at § 11-131(d) (1981 & Supp. 1986).
If the government sues under § 11-130(c) (1981), which allows the Attorney General to
sue to protect consumers from violations of this statute, limitations may apply to govern-
ment on the premise that private rights are being enforced. See Goldberg v. Howard
County Welfare Bd., 260 Md. 351, 357-58, 272 A.2d 397, 400-01 (1971); Gloyd v. Tal-
bott, 221 Md. 179, 186, 156 A.2d 665, 668 (1959).
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and for a personal representative or special administrator of an es-
tate, or an unsuccessful exceptant, to appeal to circuit court. 169
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
The fundamental difficulty with nullum tempus is that govern-
ment's need for protection from lawsuits by private parties bears no
logical relationship to defendants' need for fresh evidence.
Sovereign immunity is designed to protect government by pre-
serving public assets and avoiding the impracticalities of suing a sov-
ereign who recognizes no superior authority. The modern trend is
to curtail sovereign immunity in order to secure substantial justice
for private citizens whenever possible without unduly threatening
the larger policies that underlie the doctrine. As a result, private
parties may now bring a wide variety of tort, contract, and other
claims against government in Maryland courts. It is true that these
reforms have increased the possibility that negligence or poor ad-
ministration will cost the taxpayers money in the form of contract
and tort judgments. Mandatory insurance, however, minimizes the
potential harm from tort claims, and ordinary care in drafting and
entering into contracts ensures that the losses in contract suits will
not be extravagant. These considerations, coupled with the strong
need for private parties to have redress against government for neg-
ligent wrongs and breaches of contract, show the wisdom of the
General Assembly's decision to dilute sovereign immunity.
A similar balancing of interests leads to the conclusion that nul-
lum tempus should be abandoned. 70 Statutes of limitation should be
permitted to fulfill their primary function: protection of defendants
from stale claims. To be sure, statutory abolition of nullum tempus
would increase the chances that some government claims would be
barred by limitations. A powerful countervailing factor, however, is
that government lawyers exercising ordinary care ought to be able
to file suits on time; after all, most of Maryland's statutes of limita-
tions are measured in years, not months. Consider this, too: a web
of limitations binds government in tax collection, yet the state's cof-
fers bulge.' 7 ' Subjecting government to limitations would promote
169. Thirty days from date probate court announces allowance. MD. EST. & TRUSTS
CODE ANN. § 7-601(c) (1974).
170. Developments in the Law, supra note 25, at 1253 ("In view of the apparent absence
of sound policy ground for the sovereign exemption, complete repudiation of the rule
would seem desirable.").
171. Admittedly, these statutes give government many more years to act than most
other limitations statutes allow. See supra notes 94-107 and accompanying text. But see
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justice by eliminating stale claims, which force the courts to render
judgments based on unreliable evidence. Surely, if government can
survive responsibility for negligent acts and breaches of contract on
the part of its truck drivers, health care workers, and procurement
officers, then government can survive responsibility for failures to
timely file lawsuits on the part of its litigators.
Because of the peculiar historical role played by the General
Assembly with respect to sovereign immunity in Maryland, any re-
form aimed at modifying nullum tempus must stem from the legisla-
ture rather than the courts. 72  After the Declaration of
Independence, Maryland succeeded to the crown's sovereignty, as
did all the states of the new Union. 173 In most states, sovereign im-
munity began and has remained as judge-made law, allowing the
courts to freely mold the doctrine to fit modern circumstances. 174
In Maryland, however, the legislature entered the picture early, en-
acting a statute in 1786 that cut back common-law sovereign immu-
nity by granting all Maryland citizens the right to seek money
judgments at law against the state.' 75 Thirty-four years later, the
General Assembly repealed the act, rescinding the privilege it had
given. 176 Because of this historical background, 177 Maryland courts
now defer to the legislature and refuse to modify sovereign immu-
Developments in the Law, supra note 25, at 1252 ("[T]he argument that the rigors of stat-
utes of limitations should not be applied to overworked government officials is difficult
to square with the universal limitations on the government's taxing and penal functions,
areas in which the burden of public law enforcement is particularly heavy." (footnote
omitted)).
172. The Court of Special Appeals has offered an alternative to the rationale set out in
the text paragraph. "There is, of course, sound reason why the legislature is the proper
division of government to determine whether to abolish sovereign immunity. It is that
body that will be called upon, through the imposition of taxes, to pay any judgment
rendered against the sovereign." Herilla v. Mayor of Baltimore, 37 Md. App. 481, 486,
378 A.2d 162, 166 (1977).
173. By the United States Constitution, Maryland surrendered part of its sovereignty
to the United States. Thus, immunity from limitations accrued to the federal govern-
ment when exercising its own sovereign powers. Booth & Rench, Ex'rs of Swearingen v.
United States, 11 G. &J. 373, 377 (Md. 1841). See also Central Collection Unit v. Atlan-
tic Container Line, Ltd., 277 Md. 626, 628, 356 A.2d 555, 556-57 (1976); Godwin v.
County Comm'rs, 256 Md. 326, 333, 260 A.2d 295, 298 (1970).
174. Austin v. Mayor of Baltimore, 286 Md. 51, 67-68, 405 A.2d 255, 264 (1979) (El-
dridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
175. 1786 Md. Laws ch. 53; Austin, 286 Md. at 69, 405 A.2d at 264.
176. 1820 Md. Laws ch. 210; Austin, 286 Md. at 69, 405 A.2d at 264-65.
177. In addition to the legislature's historical domination, the Court of Appeals has
pointed to the legislature's superiority over the judicial branch in dealing with the "fiscal
considerations, administrative difficulties and other problems in balancing the rights of
the State and its agencies with new possible rights of the individual citizens." Jekofsky v.
State Roads Comm'n, 264 Md. 471, 474, 287 A.2d 40, 42 (1972).
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nity by judicial fiat.' 17  Thus, the legislature (perhaps unintention-
ally) arrogated the field to itself; it has continued to tinker with
sovereign immunity to the present day, enacting waivers of contract
immunity in 1976179 and tort immunity in 1984.181
As a result, Maryland's General Assembly is the only branch of
government that can abrogate nullum tempus and replace it with a
rational, consistent approach to the question of when limitations
should bind government. Other state legislatures-South Carolina
for one-have successfully discarded nullum tempus.' 8 1 Maryland's
legislators would be wise to adopt language similar to this para-
phrased version of the South Carolina statute: "The limitations pre-
scribed in this code shall apply to actions brought in the name of or
for the benefit of the state, counties, cities, or agencies thereof, in
the same manner as to actions by private parties."
VI. SUMMARY
Faced with a lawsuit filed by a governmental entity, a private
practitioner should first determine which statute of limitations gov-
erns the action and whether the particular governmental unit is ex-
plicitly bound by the language of the statute. If the government is
not bound, one should next ask whether the plaintiff is a local gov-
ernment exercising a proprietary function. If so, the practitioner
might successfully plead limitations. If not, the inquiry should focus
on whether the government-plaintiff is suing on a cause of action
from which the legislature has waived immunity for government-de-
fendants. If so, limitations may be successfully asserted through the
reciprocity theory. 82
The distressing number of cases that do not fall within the
above-noted exceptions to nullum tempus demonstrate the need for
legislative reform. No legitimate interests are served by permitting
178. Austin, 286 Md. at 70, 405 A.2d at 265 (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). Compare Muskopfv. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 218-19, 359
P.2d 457, 461-62, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 93-94 (1961), in whichJustice Traynor authored an
opinion abolishing governmental immunity from tort liability over a strong dissent urg-
ing that it was a matter for the legislature, id. at 221-24, 359 P.2d at 463-64, 11 Cal.
Rptr. at 95-96 (Schauer, J., dissenting).
179. 1976 Md. Laws ch. 450.
180. 1984 Md. Laws ch. 284 (enacting the State Government Article of the Maryland
Annotated Code).
181. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-620 (Law. Co-op. 1977) ("The limitations prescribed by
this article shall apply to actions brought in the name of the State or for its benefit in the
same manner as to actions by private parties .... "). See State ex reL State Highway Dept.
v. Piedmont & N. Ry. Co., 186 S.C. 49, 59, 194 S.E. 631, 635 (1938).
182. Discussed supra Section III.
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government to flout reasonable statutes of limitation. The nullum
tempus doctrine should be eradicated by statute, so as to protect pri-
vate defendants against stale claims and loss of evidence.
When should statutes of limitation bind government? Always.
THOMAS A. BOWDEN
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APPENDIX
Statute: Discussed at Footnote(s):
MD. ANN. CODE:
art. 16A , § 27 ........................................... 107
art. 23, § 199 ............................................ 150
art. 25, § IA ........................................... 62, 63
art. 25A , § IA ......................................... 62, 63
art. 25A , § 5(C C) ......................................... 78
art. 25B, § 13A ........................................ 62, 63
art. 27, § 562B ........................................... 86
art. 27, § 562C ........................................... 86
art. 27, § 562D ........................................... 86
art. 27A , § 7(d) .......................................... 121
art. 4 1, § 2-305 ........................................... 93
art. 48A , § 44 1 ........................................... 67
art. 48A , § 450 ........................................... 70
art. 56, § 135 ............................................. 99
art. 56, § 154(a) .......................................... 99
art. 81, § 212 (a), (c) ........................... 102, 105, 106
art. 8 1, § 2 15 ............................................ 157
art. 8 1, § 309 ............................................. 97
art. 8 1, § 32 1 ............................................. 9 1
art. 81, § 342(a) ......................................... 100
art. 8 1, § 348 ............................................ 158
art. 8 1, § 393 ............................................ 10 1
art. 82, § 2 .............................................. 153
art. 88B , § 27 ............................................ 127
art. 95A , § 17(g) .......................................... 90
art. 100, § 55D (b) ................................... 89, 119
MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN.:
§ 6-111 .................................................. 128
§ 8-203(b)(3) ............................................. 69
§ 11-207(d) ............................................... 92
§ 11-209(c) .............................................. 120
§ 12 -1 11 .................................................. 74
§ 12-707(g) .............................................. 149
§ 12-9 19 .................................................. 72
§ 12-10 19 ................................................ 73
§ 14-505(c) .............................................. 126
§ 14-12 14 ............................................... 15 1
§ 14-150 1(1) .............................................. 68
§ 17-206(a)(2) ........................................... 115
§ 17-208 ................................................. 115
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MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 11-703() .................. 71
MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.:
§ 3-904(g) ............................................... 152
§ 5-101. ..................................... 125
§ 5-102 (a), (c) .......................................... 116
§ 5-103(a) .......................................... 113, 132
§ 5-104(a), (b) ...................................... 117, 133
§ 5-105 .................................................. 159
§ 5-106(a) ................................................ 84
§ 5-106(b) ................................................ 85
§ 5-106(c), (d) ............................................ 82
§ 5-106(e), (f) ............................................ 87
§ 5-106(g), (h) ............................................ 88
§ 5-107 .............................................. 83, 118
§ 5-108(a) ............................................... 147
§ 5-108(b), (c) ........................................... 146
§ 5-109 .................................................. 163
§ 5-110 .................................................. 122
§ 5-11 1 .................................................. 124
§ 5-306(a) ............................................... 164
MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN.:
§ 7-60 1 (c) ............................................... 169
§ 8-103(a), (c) ...................................... 143, 144
§ 8-107(b) ............................................... 142
§ 10-103(a) .............................................. 145
MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN.:
§ 5-32 5 .................................................. 162
§ 10-102 ................................................. 124
MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN.:
§ 4-109(b) ............................................... 108
§ 6-10 1(b) ............................................... 109
§ 6-10 3 .................................................. 110
§ 8-10 7 .................................................. 111
§ 9-105(a) ............................................... 165
§ 9-109 .................................................. 166
§ 10-204 ................................................. 167
§ 10-4 0 1 ................................................. 112
§ 11-13 1(d) .............................................. 168
§ 12-109(d) .............................................. 123
§ 12-112(a), (h) .......................................... 16 1
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MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN.:
§ 12-106(b) .............................................. 148
§ 12-201 ........................................... 56,61,64
§ 12-202 .................................................. 56
§ 12-203 ............................................... 56, 57
§ 12-204 ............................................... 56, 57
MD. TAx-PROP. CODE ANN.:
§ 8-4 17(c) ................................................ 98
§ 14-808(a), (b) ........................................... 95
§ 14-833 .................................................. 66
§ 14-864 ................................................. 103
§ 14-915(1), (2), (3) ..................................... 156
§ 14-9 15(4) .............................................. 154
§ 14-9 15(5) .............................................. 155
§ 14-1101(a), (b), (c) ............................ 96, 103, 104
§ 14-1103(b) ............................................. 98
§ 14-1103(c) .............................................. 94
MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 13-210(a) ......................... 160
